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NOTE AND COMMENT
lNJURir:S ARISING "OuT OF" AN EMPI.0YM£NT.-An employee's duties take
him into the streets where 'he is injured by being run into by an automobile
or other vehicle; has he ground for recovery of compensation under the usual
WoKX:Mr:N's Co:MP£NSATION Ac::t providing for an award for injuries "arising
out of and in the course of his employment"? Since he was in the street in
pursuance of his duties and not in going to or from work, it is clear that the
injury was one arising in the "course of" the employment. But did it arise
"out of' the employment?
The English Courts had made this last question tum largely upon the
degree to which the employee was exposed to the risks of the streets. Thus
in Pierce v. Provide11t Clothing a11d Supply Co. [19u] I K. B. 997, where the
claimant was awarded compensation, the Master of the Rolls said: ''This
work of course necessarily involved spending a great part of the day in the
streets in this triangular area; and in the course of his duties he was beyond
all doubt much more exposed to the risks of the streets than ordinary members of the public". And in Sheldo11 v. Needham, III L. T. 729, 7 B. W. C. C.
471, where the claimant, a domestic servant, was injured by slipping on a
banana skin in the street while going to a mail box for the employer, the
court held there should be no award, on the ground that the injury was due
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to a risk no greater than is run by all members of the public. So also in
Slade v. Taylor, 8 B. W. C. C. 65. The Scotch Courts, on the other hand,
have not approved the degree of risk test. M'Neice v. Singer Sewing Machine
Co., l9II S. C. 12; Htiglzes v. Bett, 1915 S. C. 150; White v. Avery, 1916 S. C.
209. In the last cited case the Lord President said: "It is common ground
that the accident arose in the course of the appellant's employment. The
question for our decision is whether it arose out of his employment. Now,
the learned arbitrator came to the conclusion that it did not, because the
risk which the appellant ran in walking upon the slippery road was not a
risk to which he was exposed by the nature of his occupation, but was simply
an ordinary risk to which every pedestrian was exposed. In my view that
is an unsound statement of the law, for the risk on that road at that particular
time appears to me to have been a risk incidental to the man's employment.
And it was none the less a risk incidental to the man's employment because
every pedestrian on that road at that time would. have [been] required to
face it, or because the appellant was facing it for the first and, it may be,
the only time."
The point for English law has been set at rest by the House of Lords in
Dennis v. A. l. White & Co., [1917] A. C. 479, reversing the Court of Appeal. The claimant on his master's business had been hurt while on his
bicycle in the street by a collision with a tram-car. The conclusion of the
Scotch cases is approved, while the English cases above cited are eXPressly
disapproved. The conclusion of the House of Lords would seem to be entirely proper and desirable, the English cases having adopted an unnecessarily
narrow and technical meaning of the terms of the CoMP~NSA'tION Ac::r.
But suppose the employee is struck by lightning, or is injured by the explosion of a bomb dropped by a raiding aeroplane or Zeppelin? Perhaps but
for his employment the claimant would not have been in the zone of danger.
'!'hat, however, in the opinion of the learned lords is immaterial, unless the
duties of his employment .Placed him in a position of eXPosure to such harms
not shared by the public universally. There must still be some thread of
causal connection between the employment and the injury. Working upon a
steeple or high scaffold exposes one to peculiar perils from lightning, and
perhaps service in a brightly illuminated building or in a munitions plant involves unusual dangers from hostile aircraft. An American employee whose
duties take him to England where he is injured by such bomb \VOUld seem
to receive an injury arising "out of'' his employment. See Foley v. Home
Rubber Co., 8g N. J. L. 474 15 MICH. L. Riw. 6o6, where an award for death
on the Lusitania was allowed. If it is concluded that the duties of the employment did expose the claimant to the danger, then it is wholly immaterial
that others under like conditions but not under employment ran precisely the
same hazard. So in the case of an employee engaged in running the engine
-of a threshing outfit injured by the sting of a poisonous wasp the inquiry
should be as to whether the duties of such employee exposed him to such
perils, not as to the degree of his risk. If an injury on the street arises "out
of'' one's employment because the injured party's duties took him into the
street, and not because of the degree of risk run there, it would seem that the
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sting of the wasp was an injury arising "out of" the employment, for it
was the duty of the employee that took him out into the open where he was
exposed to such perils. But see Amys v. Barton, [1912] I K. B. 40, where
it was held that death as a result of the sting of a wasp under the circumstances ·suggested was not an accident arising "out of" the employment.
In McNichol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, the court considered the question
under consideration and laid down certain tests as follows: "It (the injury)
'arises out of' the employment, when there is apparent to the rational mind,
upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the
conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a
natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable
person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises 'out of' the employment But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard
to which the workman would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the -work and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the r~lation of master and servant It need not
have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have
had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed
from that source as a rational consequence." Here is a clear recognition of
the necessity for the causal connection. The &tatement has been frequently
cited and quoted approvingly. Hopkins v. Michigan Sugar Co., 184 Mich. 87;
In re Sa11derson's Case, 224 Mass. 558; Ohio Building Safety Vault Co. v.
ltrdustrial Board, 277 Ill. g6; H11lley v. Moosbrugger, 88 N. J. L. 161; Mann
v. Glastonbury Knitting Co., 90 Conn. n6; State v. District Court (Minn.
1917) 164 N. W. 1012. Quite generally the courts make the case tum upon
the presence or absence of "special" or "extra" hazard beyond what other
people in the same situation, aside from the employment, are exposed to,
which apparently is the very consideration repudiated by the House of Lords.
In Mahowald v. 1'/tompson-Starrett Co., 134 Minn. n3, where a teamster
injured on the street was allowed compensation, the court said: "If his employment as a teamster upon the streets of a large city, where he not only
had to look out for his own safety but also for that of his employer's team
and rig, necessarily accentuated the street risks to ltim above those to other
occasional travelers (italics ours), it suffices for the conclusion that this accident arose out of his employment". And in Hopkins v. Michigan Sugar Co.,
supra, where the decision perhaps could have gone on the ground that the
employee when hurt was not in the "course of" his employment, the court
denied an award because he had not been exposed to any more risk on the
street than any other traveler. In Beaudry v. Watkins, 191 Mich. 445, however, the court allowed cot;npensation for the death of a boy injured while on
a bicycle in the street, without any mention of the extra hazard to which
his employment exposed him.
R. W. A.
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PERFoRMANCS 0:11 AN EXISTING OBI,IGATION AS CoNSIDtRATION FOR A PROM-

1sr:.-The dictum that if there be nothing in a rule flatly contradictory to
reason the law will presume it to be well founded, and that the office of the
judge is "jus dicere and not jus dare", is responsible for much agony of construction and tortious logic on the part of courts tom by ·desire to evade it
in the interest of modern ideas of right. There is a trilogy of accepted legal
principles which it has been particularly difficult for the courts to adhere
to in spirit or to repudiate in letter. They are the propositions, that for a
promise to be enforcible a consideration must emanate from the promisee,
that doing what one is already legally bound to do is not a consideration, and
that one is legally bound to perform a contract according to its terms. In
·other words, doing what one has already contracted to do is not consideration
for a promise made on condition or in contemplation of such performance.
Under this rule, if A. has contracted to do something for B., his actual performance of that promise can not be consideration for a new pbrmise by B.
or a collateral promise by C. There is no lack of real application of the rule.
Stilk v. Myrich, 2 Camp. 317; Frazer v. Hatton, 2 C. B. N. S. 512; Harris v.
Carter, 3 E. & B. 559; Bartlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 26o; Seybolt v.
N. Y., L. E. etc. R. R., 95 N. Y. 562; Village of Seneca Falls v. Botsch, 149
N. Y. Supp. 320; Ayers v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 52 Iowa 478; Conover v.
Stillwell, 34 N. J. L. 54; Reynolds v. Nugent, 25 Ind. 328; Vance v. Ellison,
76 W. Va. 592; Muir v. Morris, 8o Ore. 378; Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91 N.
Y. 392; McDevit v. Stokes, 174 Ky. 515.
But while courts feel constrained to follow the rule, they have not been
hesitant in condemning it as unsuited to modern ideas. They "have rarely
failed, ~pon any recurrence of the question, to criticise and condemn its
reasonableness, justice, fairness or honesty". Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164
So also Mr. Ames, 12 HARV. L. REV. 515, 521; Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas.
6o5 ; Harper v. Graham, 20 Oh. 1o6. One court, at least, "profoundly and painfully impressed with the slavish adherence of the legal and judicial mind to
precedent, or, in many cases, to what seems to be precedent only", flatly
denied, so far as payment of money is concerned, that doing what one is
legally bound to do is not consideration. Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in revolt against imitation of the past as the basis of
modem law, evades the rule, unofficially, by denying that one is legally bound
·to perform a contract according to its terms. IO HARV. L. REV. 457, 462;
THJ;: COMMON LAW, pp. 300 ff. The court in Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N. H. 358,
takes the same view officially.
These, how~ver, are unusual instances. Other courts, while they evince
willingness to escape application of the rule, recognize its existence and binding force, and evade it only when they can do so on some plausible distinction or more or less specious assumption. Thus, a number of cases hold the
making of the new promise to be sufficient evidence of mutual rescission of
the first contract. On this assumption, the original contractor is no longer
bound by that agreement and his doing what he had originally promised, or
promising a second time to do it, is of course a consideration for the contractee's new promise. Stewart v. Keteltas, 36 N. Y. 388; Linz v. Schuck,
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100 Md. 220; Agel v. Patch Mfg. Co., 77 Vt. 13; Thomas v. Barnes, 156
Mass. 581. Sometimes, without denying that a contractor is legally bound to
'Perform according to the terms of the contract, courts, paradoxically, hold
that his actual performance instead of mere payment of damages for nonJlerforniance is a consideration for the new promise. Lattimore v. Harsen,
14 Johns. (N. Y.) 330; Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489; Bishop v. Busse, 6g
Ill. 403. Other courts say that performing according to existing contract instead of exercising an opprtunity to go into bankruptcy is consideration for
the new promise. l;Ielroy v. Kemmerer, 218 Pa. 381; Engbretson v. Seiberling, 122 Iowa 522. But on the whole, American courts adhere to the principles established. Even the courts which evade their application make assumption, as pointed out, that the prior obligation has been rescinded, or
<Jtherwise escape from taking the position that there is no legal obligation
to perform a contract according to its terms.
The extra cog in the wheels of logic by which consideration is explained
is the case of Shadwell v. Shadwell, 30 L. J. C. P. 145, and the English doctrine based upon it. In that case the performance by one person of what
he was already under contract to do, was held to be consideration for a
third person's promise to him. Every writer who has i::iot ignored this case
has taken his tum at condemning, harmonising or explaining the decision
according to his own ideas. No one has succeeded in making it harmonise
with both principles, that doing what one is already legally bound to do is
not consideration, and that one is legally bound to perform a contract according to its terms. But this is an English case and the trilogy of principles was
saved in this country by the fact, to quote Mr. Williston, that "the almost uniform current of authority in this country is that neither performance nor
promise of peclormance of what one is already bound to do by contract with
a third person, is a sufficient consideration to support a promise."
The Court of Appeals of New York, however, has just dammed this current
<>f authority by its decision in the case of Cicco v. Schweizer, handed down
November 13, 1917, Daily Record (Syracuse) Dec. 10, 1917. It appears from
the case, that in 1902 one Count Oberto Gulinelli was engaged to mar&
Schweizer's daughter. Four days before the marriage was to take place
Schweizer promised in writing to pay to the daughter the sum of $z,500 annually while both he and she should live. The daughter and her husband
assigned this promise to the plaintiff who sued for the installment for the
year 1912, which Schweizer had refused to pay. The written agreement
reads, "Whereas, Miss Blanche Josephine Schweizer, * * * is now affianced
to and is to be married to the above said Count Oberto Giacomo Giovanni
Francesco Maria Gulinelli, now, in consideration of all that is herein set
forth the said Mr. Joseph Schweizer promises and expressly agrees by the
present contract to pay" the sum named. From statements of the court it
appears that the promise was made to the Count only, although, the court
says, it was intended for the benefit of the daughter and she might have
sued upon it. There is nowhere in the agreement any indication that the engagement between the daughter and her count had been broken or was
about to be rescinded, and the court explicitly states that neither of the parties
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to the marriage promised the father anything. The court seems to say that
the consideration was the fact that the parties to the e.'Cisting marriage contract did not mutually rescind it. Had the promise run to bob of them the
differentiation from Shadwell v. Shadwell might have been well taken. But
it ran to the Count alone. The daughter was not a party to the father's
agreement, and that she should refrain from acquiescing in a dissolution of
. her agreement with the Count was a condition, not a consideration. To hold
the act of a third person, to whom no promise has been made, to be a consideration would be entirely out of harmony with the idea of reciprocation
between the promise and the consideration, the idea of "exchange" of promises
or of a promise for an act that is found in every definition of consideration.
There is no authority prior to the principal case for disregarding the necessity
of reciprocation. The sole consideration, therefor, was the performance by
the Count of the contract of marriage by which he was already bound at the
time of the defendant's promise. The court holds that the parties married not
because they had agreed to do so, but because the father had promised to
give the daughter $z,500 per year if they should do so.
This comes perilously close to giving the doctrine of Shadwell v. Shadwell
American authority, and it does drop an obstruction in the course of our logic.
While the decision stands as sound, either the happening of an event extraneous to the promisee's volition may be. a consideration, or one is not legally
bound to perform an existing contract, -or doing what one is already legally
bound to do may be consideration for a new promise. Either our established
notions of consideration as something within the promisee's volition and
emanating from him are upset by the case, or it is fresh authority for the
proposition that any act of the promisee induced by the promise, and intended
to be so induced, is consideration for the promise. I4 MICH. L. Rmr. 570.
J.B. W.
ACQUIRING JURISDICTION WI'l'HOU'l' P£RSONAI, SERVICE, StIZU~ OR AID OF
S'l'ATU'l't.-It is often assumed that courts can acquire jurisdiction only by
personal service to give jurisdiction in perso11am, or by a seizure to give
jurisdiction in rem; but it is not so. The assumption is induced no doubt
by the fact that in the ordinary common law actions jurisdiction is acquired
in that way. Mr. Justice Field very distinctly pointed out in the case of
Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U. S. 7I4, that it was not the fact that the
land was not seized that rendered the judgment void. It was the fact that the
land was not the res in litigation in the prior case that made the judgment
void.
Laying aside the common law actions of writ of error, certiorari, and the
like, in which superior courts always acquired jurisdiction without any personal service or seizure, as being in their nature rather continuations of prior
actions in other courts, than a grasp of fresh jurisdiction; no such explanation can be made to justify the fact that courts of probate and administration
have from the earliest history of the common law to the present time taken
jurisdiction without either of these supposed requisites. Someone suggests
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to the court that a citizen has died and petitions that his estate be administered; whereupon the court immediately takes jurisdiction without any seizure
at all, appoints someone to collect dues and guard the assets till a final hearing can be had, and orders notice published to all persons interested to appear
and defend. No seizure has ever been supposed essential to confer jurisdiction. If the administrator does in fact take possession of certain assets, no
one ever supposed that the court's jurisdiction was confined to the assets so
seized.
Courts of equity never supposed that any seizure was necessary in the
absence of personal service to give them jurisdiction in suits to quiet title,
to foreclose mortgages, and the like; nor was any such seizure ever in fact
made. The land being immovable there was no danger of it being spirited
away before a decree could be awarded, and seizure would be an idle ceremony. If a levy on the attached property in the statutory actions of attachment at law has been required by the statute, it has been rather with the
view to make sure that the property would be on hand to answer the judgment that might thereafter be rendered, than because of any notion that a
seizure was necessary to confer jurisdiction.
The statutes of the various states have long sanctioned proceedings in rem
against property in the hands of persons other than the owner without any
seizure of the property or personal notice to the owner, by merely summoning
the person in possession as garnishee; and even in case there is no tangible
property, but a mere indebtedness by the garnishee, a summons to him to
hold the indebtedness and account to the court for it has been declared by
statute to give the court jurisdiction to proceed in rem against the indebtedness without obtaining any jurisdiction in Personam against the principal
debtor; and the constitutionality of these statutes has been sustained in Harris
v. Balk (1905), lg8 U. S. 2i5, 25 S. Ct. 625, and numerous other cases.
Courts of chancery have generally refused to entertain suits in the nature
of creditors' bills until the creditor has reduced his claim to judgment at law
and had execution levied or returned nulla bona, not because of any supposed
jurisdictional impediment to entertainment of such suits without personal
service on the debtor or seizure of the property, but because the creditor has
no standing in equity till he has exhausted his remedy at law. PoMttOY, EQ.
]UR., § 1415.
But if the creditor's claim is not legal but merely equitable, for which
reason he could maintain no action at law, no reason is apparent why a
court of chancery should not take jurisdiction at once to afford him relief
though there is no tangible property that can be seized, and the defendant
cannot be personally served in the jurisdiction; and no statute expressly em-.
powers the court to act in such cases. The court would seem to possess this
jurisdiction by reason of its general jurisdiction to grant relief on the claim
involved, or because there is no adequate remedy at law.
In Murray v. Murray (18g6), II5 Cal. 266, 37 L. RA. 626, 56 Am. St. 95,
a woman who had been seduced, later married her seducer, and had been
immediately deserted by him, filed a bill for separate maintenance without
prayer for divorce, and prayed that property that he had transferred after the

I86

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

seduction but before the marriage to get it out of her reach be appropriated
for that purpose. The husband was not found in the state, did not appear,
and the transferee demurred, contending that she was not such a creditor at
the time of the transfer as could object to the transfer for fraud, and as a
creditor could not maintain a bill before obtaining judgment; but the court
sustained her bill, and said that attachment is not the only means by which
the court may acquire control of the property of the absentee defendant so as
to make it a proceeding in rem; Harrison and Temple, JJ., dissenting.
The assumption of such jurisdiction in the recent case of Kelley v. Bausman (Wash., Oct. 26, 1917), 168 Pac. 181, seems fully justified on both
reason and authority, though dissented from by Ellis, C. J., and Holcomb,
Main, and Parker, JJ. In this case complainant seeking a decree of separate
maintenance against her husband who was not found within the state, made
persons holding property belonging to him and corporations in which he
held stock, defendants, and prayed for and obtained a preliminary injunction
restraining the defendants from parting with the property, and a final decree
requiring the defendants to tum the property into the registry of the court
for her benefit.
In sustaining a similar decree in a like case appealed from the supreme
court of Ohio, Mr. Justice Brandeis said in Pennington v. Fourth National
Bank (1917), 243 U. S. 26g, 271, "In. ordinary garnishment proceedings the
obligation enforced is a debt existing at the commencement of the action,
whereas the obligation to pay alimony arises only as a result of the suit
The distinction is in this connection without legal significance. The power
of the state to proceed against the property of an absent defendant is the
same whether the obligation sought to be enforced is an admitted indebtedness or a contested claim. It is the same whether the claim is liquidated or
is unliquidated, like a claim for damages in contract or in tort It is likewise immaterial that the claim is at the commencement of the suit inchoate,
to be perfected only by time or the action of the court."
In another case, also for alimony, against a defendant not found within
the state, the supreme court of Kansas said in Wesner v. O'Brien (18g6), 56
Kan. 724, "The essential matter is that the defendant shall have legal notice
of the proposed appropriation, and ·this is afforded by the publication notice
which warns the defendant that one of the purposes of the proceeding is the
sequestration of the land. It refers interested parties to the petition, in which
the land is definitely described, and wherein it is asked that the land be set
apart as alimony: A formal seizure is no more essential to the jurisdiction
of the court in a proceeding of this kind than in an action to quiet title to
land, based alone on constructive service."
The supreme court of Iowa has gone so far as to hold in a case of this
kind, that a mere prayer for such alimony as the court shall deem equitable,
without any prayer for sequestration of the particular property to that purpose, gave the court jurisdiction to award the alimony out of property which
the complainant had caused to be attached in the proceeding in a mistaken
attempt to adapt the legal action of attachment under the statute to a suit
for divorce to which it did not extend, and although the defendant in the di-
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vorce proceeding was not served within the state and did not appear; for
the reason that the fact that the statute did not warrant attachments in
divorce proceedings was an irregularity which could not be availed of collaterally. Twing v. O'Meara (1882), 59 Iowa 326. See also Thurston v.
Thurston (18g4), 58 Minn. 279; Wood v. Price (1911), 79 N. J. Eq. 1; Benner v. Benner (1900), 63 Ohio St. 220; Bailey v. Bailey (1900), lZJ N. Car. 474J. R.R.
!NSURAN~ POLICIES AS Ass~s IN BANKRUPTCY.-The Supreme Court of
the United States, in the recent case of Cohen v. Samuels, 38 Sup. Ct. 36, has
put an end to a method, approved by some of the lower Federal Courts, whereby a person could create a fund which would be completely under his control
but which would nevertheless be protected against any claim on the part of
his trustee in bankruptcy. The circumstances in the principal case were as
follows: Samuels had taken out ordinary life insurance policies, with the
usual provisions as to loan and surrender values, payable to certain of his
Telatives as beneficiaries, but with a provision reserving to Samuels the
right to change the beneficiary without the latter's consent. At the time
of Samuels' bankruptcy these surrender values were about $1,200, and if
before that time Samuels had wished to realize on such surrender values,
all that he need have done was to name himself as beneficiary and thus become entitled to the amount. He became bankrupt, and now insists that the
policies do not pass to bis trustee in bankruptcy as assets because, not being
payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives, they do not fall
within the language of § 70, which defines what property shall pass to the
trustee. And his claim was apparently so well fortified by authority that the
District Court for the Southern District of New York felt impelled to uphold
it, and was supported by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where, however, HOUGH, C. J., registered a vigorous dissent.
The difficulty arises from the language of § 70, which provides that the
trustee shall be vested with the title of the bankrupt to various classes of
property, including "* * (3) powers which be might have exercised for
his own benefit, but not those which he might have exercised for some other
person; * * * (5) property which prior to the filing of the petition he could
by any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and
sold under judicial process against him: Provided, That when any bankrupt
shall have any insurance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to
himself, his estate, or personal representatives, he may, within thirty days
after the cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated to the trustee
by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so
ascertained and stated, and continue to hold, own and carry such policy free
from the claims of the creditors, * * * otherwise the policy shall pass to the
trustee as assets; * * *" In the earlier years of the administration of the
BANKRUPTCY Ac:r there was considerable doubt as to the precise effect of this
proviso as to life-insurance policies. Some courts took the view that such
policies passed to the trustee as property which the bankrupt "could by any
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means have transferred" except that he might retain those having a surrender value by paying this value to the trustee; under this view it is clear
that the trustee would be entitled to a policy like those under consideration,
because it could have been transferred by the bankrupt. Other courts took
the view that no policies passed to the trustee except those having a surrender value, and they only to the extent of that value. The latter view was
finally adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Burlingham v.
Crouse, 228 U. S. 459 and Everett v. Judson, 2:z8 U. S. 474 though in the
earlier case of Hiscock v. Mertens, 205 U. S. 202, there is some indication
that the court at that time inclined toward the foi:mer view.
In his opinion in Burlingham v. Crouse, Mr. Justice DAY used the words:
"We think it was the purpose of Congress to pass to the trustee that sum
which was available to the bankrupt at the time of bankruptcy as a cash
asset
And those words have frequently been construed as a limitation
on the interest which the trustee can obtain. In ~MINGTON, BANKRUP'.rCY,
§ 1002, for instance, the rule is expressed as follows : "The trustee is entitled
to the cash surrender value, and only to the cash surrender value tl1at would
have been obtainable from the insurance company at the date of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition, upon all policies on the bankrupt's life that are not
exempt by state law and that are payable to the bankrupt, his estate or personal
representative.'' Practically the same proposition is stated in CoLLmR, BANKRUPTCY, (nth Ed.) u39. Such a limitation, restricting the trustee's right
to the cash surrender value payable at the time of the fling of the petition,
and to policies payable to the bankrupt, was hardly necessary to the decision
of the Burlingham case, but, as is seen above, it was adopted as law by text
writers (though ~MING'l'ON insisted that the contrary view was preferable)'
and was followed in most of the subsequently arising cases in which the precise point was presented. In most of these cases the policy was, under state
laws, exempt from the claims of creditors, and under § 6 of the BANKRUP'.rCY
AC1t would therefore not pass to the trustee in any event. In re Cohen, 230
Fed. 733; Frederick v. Insurance Co., 235 Fed. 639. But the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in In re Arkin, 231 Fed. 947, 146 C. C. A.
143, decided that such a policy did not pass to the trustee, and the same court
came to the same conclusion in the principal case when it was before them, in
In re Samuels, 237 Fed. 7g6, 151 C. C. A. 38. In both these cases the court
relied on its previous decision in In re Hammel & Co., 221 Fed. 56, 137 C.C.A.
So, but as is clearly pointed out by HouGH, C. J., in his dissent in 237 Fed. 799,
151 C. C. A. 41, the Hammel case dealt with a policy which did not have a surrender value, but only a loan value. In the case of In re Bonvillain, 232 Fed.
370, the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that under
the law of Louisiana such a policy would pass to the trustee, but it seems that
this case, like the somewhat similar case of Malone v. Cohn, 230 Fed. 882,
150 C. C. A. 144 is based on a misconception of the effect of § 70 as declared
in Burlingham v. Crouse, and treats the policy as property governed by the
general language of the section, and not as a peculiar class of property governed by the proviso.
The Supreme Court of the United States, when confronted by the problem
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in the principal case, did not minimize the difficulties raised by the language
in Burlingham v. Crouse which seems to put a strict limitation upon the trustee's rights but cut the Gordian lmot by invoking clause (3) of § 70, which
vests the trustee in bankruptcy with powers which the bankrupt could have
exercised for his own benefit. This way out of the difficulty brings about a
desirable result, though it somewhat weakens the theory that the proviso in
§ 70 is a complete, exclusive, self-contained expression of all the law as to
life-insurance policies in bankruptcy. And the court says : "Our conclusions
would be the same if we regarded the proviso alone", justifying its conclusion by the obviously undesirable result of a contrary holding in making an
insurance policy "a shelter for valuable assets and, it might be, for fraud".
It seems clear that the Circuit Court of Appeals gave an unwarranted effect
to the decision in Burlingham v. Crouse, and that the Supreme Court has in
the principal case laid down a much more desirable rule.
E. H.

